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NOTRE DAME
LAWYER
A Quarterly Law Review
VOL. XXVI WINTFR, 1951 No. 2
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT*
DURING the five year period following V-J Day, moreDthan 150 resolutions were introduced in Congress call-
ing for the amendment of the Federal Constitution. In
1947, an amendment limiting the tenure of the president
was submitted to the states and has now been ratified by
24 of them.' A proposal for changing the method of
electing the president was adopted by the Senate early in
1950,2 but was defeated in the House of Representatives.'
All of this agitation for a change in the fundamental law
has stimulated a renewed interest in the interpretation of
the amending clause itself.' Numerous disputes have arisen,
*This a second article dealing with the amending process under Article V
of the Constitution. The previous article, The Significance and Adoption of
Article V of the Constitution by Paul J. Scheips can be found at p. 46 in the
Fall issue of this volume. [Editor's note.]
1 61 STAT. 959 (1947).
2 96 Cong. Rec. 1307 (Feb. 1, 1950).
3 Id., at 10587 (July 17, 1950).
4 Article V reads: "The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses
shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on
the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall
call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be
valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified
by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions
in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may he
proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made
prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Man-
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many of which are still unresolved, as to the nature and
scope of the amending power, the procedure by which
amendments are proposed, and the entire process by which
the assent of the states is given.
Prior to 1939 these questions were usually determined by
the judiciary. In Coleman v. Miller,5 decided in that year,
the Supreme Court indicated that most, if not all, of such
controversies will be left to Congress in the future. That
decision probably will have little effect on those phases of
the process which are the immediate responsibility of Con-
gress-that is to say, the content of amendments and the
procedure for proposing them-but it may enhance the im-
portance of technical objections to methods of ratification
followed in various states. Such objections will afford an
opportunity to reconsider, and an excuse to kill, any change
proposed by an earlier Congress.
I.
Content of Amendments
Controversy over the permissible content of amendments
began in the Constitutional Convention itself. Madison's
Journal discloses that during the debate on Article V, "Mr.
Sherman expressed his fears that three fourths of the States
might be brought to do things fatal to particular States..."
and moved to add a proviso "that no State shall without its
consent be affected in its internal police, or deprived of its
equal suffrage in the Senate." This motion was defeated
but immediately thereafter the Convention adopted the sec-
ond part of it.6 Persistence of the fears expressed by Sher-
man prompted Congress, in 1861, to propose, and three
ner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article;
and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage
in the Senate."
5 307 U. S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972, 83 L. Ed. 1385 (1939).
6 MADiSON, Tm_ DEBATEs iN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHicH
FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITD STATES 573 (Hunt and Scott ed.
1920).
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states to ratify, an amendment barring any future changes
which would "interfere, within any State, with the domestic
institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor
or service by the laws of said State." 7
The defeat of Sherman's motion, the adoption of an ex-
press restriction on change of representation in the Senate,
and general acquiescence in the substantial curtailment of
state powers effected by the Civil War amendments, would
seem to have established beyond challenge that the amend-
ing clause is not to be narrowed by implied limitations.'
Nevertheless, many years after the Civil War, George Tich-
nor Curtis found in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments a
basis for the argument that the power to amend is confined
to changes in the manner of executing the existing powers
of the national government and does not "enable three
fourths of the states to grasp new power at the expense
of any unwilling state." '
With the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, this
debate was carried into the courts. Claiming that the
Amendment was void because of its substance, its oppon-
ents argued that the framers used the term "amend" in
the sense attached to it by the common law; that "amend-
ment" embraced only a correction of errors in the existing
constitution, not an addition or supplement to it. They
complained that the Eighteenth Amendment was "legisla-
tive" in that it laid down a rule for the conduct of in-
7 Awms, PROPOSED A'ENDmENTS TO THE CONSTITUIrON o THE UNITED
STATES 196 (1897).
8 In Leser v. Garnett, 258 U. S. 130, 42 S. Ct. 217, 66 L. Ed. 50 (1922),
the Supreme Court refused to consider the argument that the Nineteenth
Amendment was invalid because, by enlarging the electorate without the consent
of the states which did not ratify it, it destroyed their autonomy as political
bodies. Noting that this Amendment was similar in character and phraseology
to the Fifteenth and that both had been adopted by the same procedure, it
dismissed the objection with this observation: "That the 15th is valid, although
rejected by six states, including Maryland, has been recognized and acted on for
half a century." Id., 258 U. S. at 136.
9 2 CURTIS, CONsTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 161 (Clayton
ed. 1896).
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dividuals without implementing legislation 'by Congress or
the states; that it regulated vested rights, and infringed
"fundamental and unamendable" principles protective of
the powers of the states in the field of local government
and individual rights. Whence they concluded that this
Amendment was contrary to the spirit and intent and im-
plied limitations of the amending power. The Supreme
Court was not impressed by this labored reasoning. With-
out refuting the arguments in detail, it simply announced
that the subject matter of the Eighteenth Amendment was
within the power to amend reserved by Article V of the
Constitution.1
Far-fetched as much of the argumentation obviously was,
underlying it was a fundamental question of constitutional
theory regarding the nature of the power with which Article
V deals. This question may be put as follows: Is it the
purpose and result of Article V to delegate a certain power
of constitutional amendment to the agencies designated ,by
it, or is it merely to provide a method for the more con-
venient future use of an already existing power of the peo-
ple? In a sense, the direct prohibition in Article V of any
amendment to deprive a state of its equal representation in
the Senate contradicts both the theory that the power to
amend springs from the same source as the Constitution 'it-
self, and the contention that it is subject to implied limi-
tations. If the amending power is the same power which
ordained and established the original Charter, any limita-
tion on it must be considered as having only such force and
validity as the amending power itself may at any time
choose to accord it-it has the moral force of a promise
given more than one hundred sixty years ago. On the other
hand, the'very presence of this specifically stated limitation
may be taken as an indication that no other restrictions of
the same nature were intended. It is not, however, incon-
10 National Prohibition Cases (Rhode Island v. Palmer) 253 U. S. 350, 40
S. Ct. 486, 64 L. Ed. 946 (1920).
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sistent with a concept of the term "amendment" which
would restrict it to a modification of the existing instrument
rather than an addition to it.
In the First Congress, Sherman suggested that there was
a difference between the authority upon which the Consti-
tution rested and that upon which amendments would rest,
the former being the "act of the people"; the latter, "the
act of the State Governments." " The theory stated by
the Supreme Court shortly before the Civil War in the case
of Dodge v. Woolsey 2 seems to be much the same. The
view set forth in Justice Wayne's opinion is that since the
power to amend the Constitution is one to be exercised by
agents, it must be treated as a delegated power and so a
constitutionally limited power. But is this the theory of
the Court today? On the strength of much that it has said
in the cases arising out of the Eighteenth Amendment, the
question must be answered in the negative. In Dillon v.
Gloss we find Justice Van Devanter speaking for a unani-
mous Court as follows: 13
Thus the people of the United States, by whom the Con-
stitution was ordained and established, have made it a con-
dition to amending that instrument that the amendment be
submitted to representative assemblies in the several States
and be ratified in three-fourths of them. The plain meaning
of this is (a) that all amendments must have the sanction
of the people of the United States, the original fountain of
power, acting through representative assemblies, and (b) that
ratification by these assemblies in three-fourths of the States
shall be taken as a decisive expression of the people's will
and be binding on all.
Nothing apparently could be plainer; the authority by
which amendments to the Constitution are made is that by
which the Constitution itself was ordained-it is the su-
preme authority of the people of the United States. To be
sure, it can be exercised in accordance with the Constitu-
11 1 ANNALS oF CONG. 708 (1789).
12 18 How. 331, 15 L. Ed. 401 (U. S. 1856).
1 256 U. S. 368, 374, 41 S. Ct. 510, 65 L. Ed. 994 (1921).
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tion only through certain "delegated agents"; but the essen-
tial question is what authority it is that such delegates are
at any time exercising. The answer of the Court seems to
be that the power thus exerted in amending the Constitu-
tion is the ultimate right of the people in the choice of
their political institutions.
Nor can the people of any state, by any provision in
their state constitution, disable themselves or their repre-
sentatives from exercising this right. The constitution
adopted by Missouri in 1875 declared that "the Legislature
is not authorized to adopt, nor will the people of this State
ever assent to any amendment of change of the Constitu-
tion of the United States which may in anywise impair the
right of local self-government belonging to the people of
this State." On the strength of this provision, the right
of the Missouri Legislature to ratify the Nineteenth
Amendment was assailed in Leser v. Garnett."4 The limi-
tation was held to be ineffective and the ratification valid,
the Court saying that 15
... the function of a state legislature in ratifying a pro-
posed Amendment to the Federal Constitution, like the func-
tion of Congress in proposing the amendment, is a federal
function, derived from the Federal Constitution; and it trans-
cends any limitations sought to be imposed by the people of
a State.
II.
Submission of Amendments
The first question to arise respecting amendments to the
Constitution was as to the form they should take. On June
8, 1789, James Madison, in fulfillment of the informal un-
derstanding upon which the Constitution had been ratified
in some of the states, laid before the House of Representa-
tives certain proposals of amendment which he planned to
14 258 U. S. 130, 42 S. Ct. 217, 66 L. Ed. 505 (1922).
15 Id., 258 U. S. at 137.
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have inserted in the text of the Constitution at appropriate
places. 6 When, however, the House went into Committee
of the Whole on the proposed additions, Roger Sherman at
once entered a protest against the idea of interweaving
amendments with the original Constitution, urging that the
latter sprang from a higher authority than the amending
power. 1 He thereupon moved that the suggested amend-
ments be proposed as supplementary to the Constitution.
Other members supported the motion, one offering the sing-
ular argument that to connive in any alteration of the text
of the Constitution would be a violation of the oath of mem-
bers to support it; 18 while a third contended that if amend-
ments were incorporated in the body of the Constitution
"it will appear, unless we refer to the archives of Congress,
that George Washington and the other worthy characters
who composed the Convention, signed an instrument which
they never had in contemplation." 1 Although rejected at
the outset,2" Sherman's proposal eventually prevailed and
the precedent thus created has been followed ever since;
even the Twelfth Amendment, which definitely supersedes
a part of the text of Article II, appears as a supplement to
the original document.
On the same occasion the suggestion was offered that be-
fore either House could properly deliberate upon specific
amendments, both Houses must pass resolutions by the re-
quired two-thirds vote affirming the necessity for amend-
ment.2' No attention was paid to the suggestion, and in
the National Prohibition Cases 22 the Court ruled, very sen-
sibly, that the Houses, by proposing an amendment, indi-
cate that they deem it necessary. From another angle,
16 1 ANNAs OF CONG. 433-6 (1789).
17 Id. at 707.
18 Id. at 709.
19 Id. at 710.
20 Id. at 717.
21 Id. at 430.
22 253 U. S. 350, 386, 40 S. Ct. 486, 64 L. Ed. 946 (1920).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
nevertheless, the phrase has significance. It discredits en-
tirely the argument offered in support of the Eighteenth
Amendment while it was pending in Congress, that the ques-
tion of the desirability of a proposed amendment was one
for the state ratifying bodies rather than for the proposing
body.23 There is, to be sure, a certain ambiguity in the
word "necessary." It may be surmised that when two-
thirds of the Senate voted to submit the Seventeenth
Amendment to the States, they were prompted by the be-
lief that submission of the Amendment was unavoidable,
not that the proposed change in the Constitution was de-
sirable.
By the precedent set in 1789 and followed ever since, the
requirement that "two-thirds of both Houses" vote to sub-
mit a proposed amendment applies only to the final vote of
proposal in each House; all preliminary votes may be by a
simple majority.24 What, however, is the meaning of the
word "Houses" in this context? Does it mean the total
membership thereof, or simply the members present, there
being a quorum of these? For all legislative purposes, it
means the latter, and in 1789 it was assumed that the same
word is used in the same sense in Article V.25 This view
was confirmed by the Supreme Court in the National Pro-
hibition Cases.
An interesting question has been raised concerning the
submission of the pending amendment to limit the tenure
of the president. The original resolution adopted by the
House of Representatives was amended by the Senate. As
thus modified, the proposed amendment was approved in
23 56 CONG. REc. 438 (1917).
24 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 717 (1789).
25 The resolution proposing the amendments submitted to the states in
1789 was adopted in the House with "two-thirds of the members present con-
curring," JOURNAL OF THE HoUsE oF REPRESENTATIVES, 1st and 2nd Congress
85, 86 (1789-93); similarly, the Senate Resolution approving (with some ex-
ceptions) the amendments proposed by the House, contains the phrase "two
thirds of the Senators present concurring." JouRNAL oF THE SENATE, 1st and
2nd Congress 77 (1789-93).
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the lower House by a vote of 81 to 29.6 Since the mem-
bership of that House is 435, 218 members constitute a
quorum. Hence it has been argued that at least 146 votes,
being two-thirds of 218, were necessary for adoption of the
resolution in its final form.27 Support for this contention is
found in the Prohibition Cases, where, in rejecting the argu-
ment that two-thirds of the entire membership must concur
in proposing an amendment, Justice Van Devanter said:
"The two-thirds vote in each House which is required in
proposing an amendment is a vote of two-thirds of the
members present,--assuming the presence of a quorum,-
and not a vote of two-thirds of the entire membership,
present and absent." 2 Similar expressions are to be found
in other judicial utterances and in legislative rulings, which,
however, were addressed to situations where the affirmative
votes equalled the required majority of a quorum.29
The final vote for submission of the amendment was
sufficient under Rule XV of the House of Representatives.
As interpreted by that rule, the requirement of a quorum
applies only to the number of members who must 'be pres-
ent in order for the House to have authority to transact
business; it does not require that any minimum number of
members vote upon a particular proposition. In 1898 a
dispute arose over the vote necessary for the adoption of a
resolution proposing an amendment for the popular election
of Senators. Speaker Reed made the following ruling: 30
The provision of the Constitution says "two-thirds of both
Houses." What constitutes a House? A quorum of the mem-
bership, a majority, one-half and one more. That is all that
is necessary to constitute a House to do all the business that
26 93 CONG. REc. 2392 (1947).
27 N. Y. Times, April 3, 1947, p. 24, col. 6.
28 253 U. S. 350, 386, 40 S. Ct. 486, 64 L. Ed. 946 (1920).
29 Missouri P. Ry. v. Kansas, 248 U. S. 276, 284, 39 S. Ct. 93, 63 L. Ed.
239 (1919); United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U. S. 1, 6, 12 S. Ct.
507, 36 L. Ed. 321 (1892); 8 CANNON, PRECDENTS or TnE Housa OF REP-
RESENTAT¢ES § 3503 (1936); S HiNDs, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF RERasEr-
TATIVES § 7028 (1907).
30 5 Hims, op. dct. supra note 29, § 7027.
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comes before the House. Among the business that comes
before the House . . . is a proposed amendment to the Con-
stitution; and the practice is uniform . . . that if a quorum
of the House is present the House is constituted and two-
thirds of those voting are sufficient in order to accomplish
the object.
The Congressional Record discloses that after the vote
on the motion to concur in the Senate amendments had
been taken, a member made and then withdrew the point
of order that a quorum was not present.3 ' Accordingly, it
is to be presumed that a quorum was present at that time."
A further question arises whether a proposed amend-
ment has to be laid before the president for his approval.
In view of the sweeping language of Article I, Section 7, it
would seem so, especially as the "Houses" therein mention-
ed are the same "Houses" which function under Article V.
But the First Congress transmitted the proposed Bill of
Rights to the states, via the president without asking or
suggesting that he approve it.3 3 Here again, what was done
in 1789 has determined subsequent practice, having, indeed,
been approved by the Supreme Court as early as 1798."4
An alternative method of proposing amendments is by a
convention which Congress "shall" call upon the the appli-
cation of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states. The
first petitions for a convention were filed in 1788 and 1789
by Virginia and New York, respectively. The next occurred
in 1832 and 1833 and came from Georgia and Alabama.
In the sessions of Congress just prior to the Civil War pe-
titions were received from the legislatures of six states,
praying that a drafting convention be summoned. On sev-
eral occasions during that era various members of Congress
also offered resolutions for that purpose. 5  The greatest
31 93 CONG. REc. 2392 (1947).
32 6 CANNON, op. cit. supra note 29, §§ 565, 565a, 624.
33 i ANNALS Op CONG. 913-4 (1789).
34 Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378, 1 L. Ed. 644 (U. S. 1798).
35 Amxs, op. cit. supra note 7, at 282, 311, 345, 356-64.
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sustained effort to set in motion this machinery for propos-
ing a change in the Constitution was made between 1895
and 1913, during which period 33 states filed applications,
the great majority of which were in furtherance of an
amendment providing for the popular election of Senators,
others of which had an anti-polygamy amendment as their
objective, and only a few of which suggested a convention
of indefinite powers.36 Within the past decade a number of
state legislatures have formally petitioned Congress to call
a convention for the purpose of proposing an amendment
to limit the rate of federal income taxation.37
It appears from Madison's Journal that the framers in-
tended this provision for the calling of a convention to be
mandatory.38 Conceding that proposition, there remains a
question as to when the condition "on the application of
the legislatures of two-thirds of the several states" shall be
deemed to have been fulfilled. In 1929 the Legislature of
Wisconsin reminded Congress that 35 states had filed
applications for a constitutional convention and called upon
it to "perform the mandatory duty . . . and forthwith call
a convention to propose amendments to the constitution of
the United States." 3' The 35 states listed in this memorial
included every state but one which had ever petitioned
Congress to call a convention for any purpose-even Vir-
ginia, Alabama and Georgia, which had filed no such ap-
plications since 1788, 1832 and 1833, respectively. This
resolution was ignored, no doubt on the theory subsequently
approved in Dillon v. Gloss that the successive steps in the
process of constitutional amendment should not be widely
separated in time.4" To be obligatory upon Congress, the
applications of the states should be reasonably contempor-
aneous with one another, for only then would they be per-
36 Federal Constitutional Convention, Sasw. Doe. No. 78, 71st Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1930).
37 90 CONG. R c. A3969 (1944).
38 MADISOm, op. cit. supra note 6, at 574.
39 71 CONG. Ric. 3369 (1929).
40 256 U. S. 368, 374, 41 S. Ct. 510, 65 L. Ed. 994 (1921).
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suasive of a real consensus of opinion throughout the na-
tion for holding a convention, and by the same token,
they ought also to be expressive of similar views respecting
the nature of the amendments to be sought.
Although no convention has ever been held, the provision
has not been entirely ineffective. The petitions just men-
tioned, asking for a convention to propose an amendment
for the popular election of Senators, undoubtedly were in-
strumental in bringing about the submission by Congress it-
self of the Seventeenth Amendment, a reform which the
Senate had long resisted.
But is it essential that two-thirds of the state legisla-
tures, or any number thereof, should make application to
Congress for a convention in order to enable Congress to
call one; why may not Congress summon a convention on
its own initiative? No such call has ever been made, but
if we assume that the machinery which is prescribed by
Article V for amending the Constitution is a particular or-
ganization of the inherent power of the people of the
United States to determine their political institutions, then
it would seem that Congress's obligation to call a conven-
tion upon the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of
the States was not thought to exhaust its power in this re-
spect, but was intended merely to specify a contingency in
which it would be under the moral necessity of exercising
it. If, however, the powers of Congress under Article V
represent something less than this plenary power of the
people, then its obligation to call a convention in the con-
tingency of a demand upon it to do so by the legislatures
of two-thirds of the States may very well comprise its full
power in the premises.
However, an amendment is proposed, Congress must de-
cide whether it shall be ratified by state legislatures or by
conventions in the states. In United States v. Sprague 4' it
41 282 U. S. 716, 51 S. Ct. 220, 75 L. Ed. 640 (1931).
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was argued that by the Tenth Amendment "the people re-
served to themselves powers over their own personal lib-
erty, and that the legislatures are not competent to enlarge
the powers of the federal government in that behalf ...
the people never delegated to the Congress the unrestricted
power of choosing the mode of ratification of a proposed
amendment;" 42 that the Eighteenth Amendment was of
the latter character; and hence, having been ratified only
by the state legislatures, was invalid. The district court,
ignoring this argument, substituted one of its own which
led to the same practical result. Judge Clark was willing
to concede that Congress originally had possessed the right
to choose between the two types of referendum, but con-
cluded that the subsequent progress of political science had
established the constitutional convention as the appropriate
instrumentality for effecting constitutional changes of major
importance.43 The Supreme Court rejected both argu-
ments. It found the language of Article V to be too en-
tirely free from ambiguity to admit of reading into it the
teachings of political science or other outside considerations.
Furthermore, it pointed out, Congress had never resorted
to conventions up to that time, notwithstanding the fact
that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth and
Nineteenth Amendments "touch rights of the citizens" at
vital points.4
What did the framers have in mind when they referred
to conventions -in the states? No doubt much the same
type of bodies as those to which they themselves referred
the original Constitution, namely, bodies which would be
created ad hoc for the sole purpose of passing upon cer-
tain amendments referred to them, and which, once they
had done so, would be functus officio. How, then, are such
bodies to be summoned into existence? The conventions
which ratified the original Constitution assembled upon the
42 Id., 282 U. S. at 733.
43 44 F. (2d) 967, 981 (D. N.J. 1930).
44 282 U. S. 716, 734, 51 S. Ct. 220, 75 L. Ed. 640 (1931).
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"recommendation" of the several state legislatures. But the
• whole process by which the Constitution was established
was so exceptional that it contributes little to the solution
of the present problem. The power seems clearly to belong
to Congress in its legislative capacity, as auxiliary to the
power delegated to it by Article V in the submission of
amendments. Serious practical difficulties would, of course,
be encountered if Congress decided to proceed without the
co-operation of state legislatures. In addition to determin-
ing the make-up of the convention and who might vote for
delegates thereto, the federal lawmakers would have to set
up the machinery for conducting the election and provide
funds both for the election and for the functioning of the
conventions.
When the Twenty-first Amendment was under consider-
ation, A. Mitchell Palmer, who had been Attorney General
during Wilson's administration, brought forward a plan de-
signed to by-pass the state legislatures. 5 It would have
authorized the governor of each state to call an election
for delegates to a convention. The election was to be state-
wide for a panel of delegates representing each side of the
question and was to be held in accordance with the election
laws of such state. The voters were to be electors qualified
under the respective state laws. The expenses of the elec-
tion were to be met by a national appropriation. In the
end Congress decided to leave the matter to the state legis-
latures, and the expediency of this course was vindicated by
the fact that ratification was consummated in less than a
year. Only five states failed to take steps for the holding
of a convention. Forty-three enacted the necessary en-
abling legislation. In North Carolina the electorate voted
against holding a convention after the legislature had made
provision for calling one.46
45 76 CONG. REc. 130 (1932).
46 Myers, The Process of Constitutional Amendment, SEN. Doe. No. 314,
76th Cong., 3d. Sess. 23 n. 62 (1940). In three States the scheduled conven-
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Having submitted an amendment to the states, may Con-
gress thereafter withdraw it? Some commentators have ex-
pressed the opinion that this cannot be done.47 However,
much that Chief Justice Hughes said in Coleman v. Miller
concerning the factors which would have to be considered in
determining what was a reasonable time for ratification could
also be urged in support of an affirmative answer to this ques-
tion. He wrote: 4
When a proposed amendment springs from a conception of
economic needs, it would be necessary, in determining whether
a reasonable time had elapsed since its submission, to consider
the economic conditions prevailing in the country, whether these
had so far changed since the submission as to make the pro-
posal no longer responsive to the conception which inspired it
or whether conditions were such as to intensify the feeling of
need and the appropriateness of the proposed remedial action.
... [These questions] can be decided by the Congress with the
full knowledge and appreciation ascribed to the national legis-
lature of the political, social and economic conditions which
have prevailed during the period since the submission of the
amendment.
If, as the concurring Justices argued in this case, all ques-
tions concerning the submission of amendments are for
Congress alone to decide, the right of formal withdrawal
is of little moment; the lawmakers almost certainly could
find some pretext to inter an amendment believed to be no
longer desirable.
III.
Ratification of Amendments
After an amendment which is within the power reserved
by Article V has been lawfully proposed, further questions
tions did not assemble because ratification was completed before the date ap-
pointed for their meeting. Ibid. For a valuable article on the whole story
see Brown, The Ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment, 29 Am. PoL. Scr.
REv. 1005 (1935).
47 CoNG. GLOBs, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1477, 1479 (1870) (argument of
Roscoe Conkling); JAMESON, CosIr UoNAL CONVENTIONS § 585 (4th ed. 1887).
48 307 U. S. 433, 453, 59 S. Ct. 972, 83 L. Ed. 1385 (1939).
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arise concerning the action of the states in giving or with-
holding their assent to it. These problems fall into two cate-
gories-those relating to the right of the state legislature to
act upon the proposition at the time it undertakes to do so,
and those dealing with the procedure whereby it shall ex-
press its will.
When May a State Act?
The debate as to when a state is at liberty to ratify or
reject a proposed amendment has been directed to three
subsidiary inquiries: How long after its submission does an
amendment remain open for ratification? When is action
by a state legislature foreclosed by its own prior acceptance
or rejection of the proposal? May postponement of con-
sideration be required by a state constitution or statute?
Four amendments submitted prior to the Civil War-
two of the twelve proposed in 1789, one proposed in 1810
and one in 1861-have never been ratified. The same is
true of the Child Labor Amendment proposed in 1924. Are
these amendments still to be regarded as pending? As a
matter of fact, the Ohio Legislature adopted a resolution
in 1873 purporting to ratify one of the 1789 proposals."
Perhaps it was with this circumstance in mind that Con-
gress added a third "section" to the Eighteenth Amend-
ment which provided that ratification must take place in
seven years. This was an obviously futile proceeding. As
part of an unratified amendment, the provision was in-
operative, and if ratification had taken place after the pre-
scribed date it would still have been inoperative unless the
ratification was valid in spite of it! In Dillon v. Gloss the
Supreme Court properly treated the so-called "section" as
a part, not of the amendment itself, but of the resolution
of proposal, and sustained it on the ground that it gave
effect to the implications of Article V that ratification
49 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U. S. 368, 372, 41 S. Ct. 510, 65 L. Ed. 994 (1921).
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"must be sufficiently contemporaneous . . . to reflect the
will of the people in all sections at relatively the same
period . 50
In this same case Justice Van Devanter intimated that
the four proposals which antedate 1900 were no longer
open to ratification.5 But when asked to hold that the
Child Labor Amendment could not be ratified thirteen
years after its submission, the Court refused to decide the
issue, saying that this was a political question which should
be left for the determination of Congress in the event
three-fourths of the states ever gave their assent to the
proposal.52
Does a state legislature exhaust its power to act on an
amendment by the adoption of a resolution accepting or
rejecting it? In Coleman v. Miller, Chief Justice Hughes
reviewed the events leading up to the proclamation that the
Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified and concluded
that "the political departments of the Government dealt
with the effect 'both of previous rejection and of attempted
withdrawal and determined that both were ineffectual in
the presence of an actual ratification." " This proposition
rests upon a concurrent resolution adopted by Congress in
1868, declaring the Fourteenth Amendment operative as a
part of the Constitution. That resolution included in the
list of states which had ratified the Amendment the names
of three-Louisiana, North Carolina and South Carolina-
which first rejected and later ratified the proposal, and of
50 Id., 256 U. S. at 375. In 1930 Fiorella La Guardia, then a member of the
House of Representatives, made an ingenious argument that the effect of Section
three was to limit the duration of the Eighteenth Amendment to a period of seven
years after ratification unless it was reratified by three-fourths of the states within
that period. His reasoning was that the section could not have applied to the
original ratification because it was not then a part of the Constitution; therefore
it must be interpreted to operate prospectively after the original ratification of the
amendment made it a part of the Constitution. 72 CONG. Rac. 1898 (1930).
51 256 U. S.368, 375,41 S. Ct. 510, 65 L. Ed. 994 (1921).
52 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 454, 59 S. Ct. 972, 83 L. Ed. 1385 (1939).
53 Id., 307 U. S. at 449.
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two--New Jersey and Ohio-which had attempted to with-
draw their earlier ratifications.
Upon closer examination this legislative precedent is
found to be less conclusive than the opinion of the Chief
Justice indicated. There was another, quite distinct, issue
involved in the dispute as to whether the Fourteenth
Amendment had been duly ratified; namely, whether the
seceding states should be counted in ascertaining the num-
ber of states necessary for ratification. On January 11,
1868, before any state had attempted to change its mind,
either by ratifying after rejection, or by retracting its pre-
vious consent, Senator Sumner of Massachusetts introduced
a joint resolution which recited that twenty-two states had
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and declared that it was
to all intents and purposes a part of the Constitution.55 A
similar resolution was offered in the House of Representa-
tives by Representative Bingham on January 13th.56 Two
days later, the Ohio Legislature voted to revoke its assent
which previously had been certified to the Secretary of
State. On January 31st, Sumner expressed the opinion that
the attempted withdrawal of Ohio's ratification was inef-
fective. After stating that the "assent of the State once
given is final," he went on to say that the action of Ohio
was a nullity because the Amendment was already a part
of the Constitution. He declared: "
This amendment was originally proposed by a vote of
two thirds of Congress, composed of the representatives of
the loyal States. It has now been ratified by the Legislatures
of three fourths of the loyal States, being the same States
which originally proposed it, through their representatives in
Congress. The States that are competent to propose a con-
stitutional amendment are competent to adopt it. Both
things have been done. The required majority in Congress
have proposed it; the required majority of States have
54 15 STAT. 709 (1868).
55 CONr. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 453 (1868).
56 Id. at 475.
57 Id. at 877.
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adopted it. Therefore I say this resolution of the Legisla-
ture of Ohio is brutum fulmen-impotent as words without
force.
In a brief exchange with Sumner, Reverdy Johnson of
Maryland voiced the tentative impression that assent could
be withdrawn at any time before ratification was complete.
Said he: "
* . . supposing the amendment not to have been adopted
... my impression is that they can withdraw; . . . I look
upon what the States do preliminary to a decision of a ma-
jority which, when made, makes the amendment proposed
a part of the Constitution as a mere promise or undertaking
that each will assent when the others are ready to assent, but
that the day after the assent is given, or at any period sub-
sequent to the giving of the assent, if the State assenting
thinks that it has made a mistake, and that the Constitution
should not be amended in the way proposed, it may with-
draw its assent.
In the Senate, the Ohio resolutions were referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary, which also had Sumner's orig-
inal motion under consideration.59 No further action was
taken by that House until July 9th, when it called upon the
Secretary of State for a list of the states which had ratified
the amendment.60 By that time the New Jersey Legisla-
ture also had voted to revoke its ratification and six addi-
tional states, including Louisiana, North Carolina and South
Carolina, had ratified. On July 18th, Sherman introduced a
new resolution declaring the amendment effective; this also
was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary,6 which
was discharged from consideration thereof on July 20th.62
The following day, after being changed to a concurrent
resolution, it was approved in the Senate without debate
and without a record vote. It was rushed to the House of
Representatives which promptly concurred, also without de-
58 Id. at 878.
59 Id. at 453, 878.
60 Id. at 3857.
61 Id.at 4197.
62 Id. at 4230.
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bate, but by a yea-and-nay vote.63 In this resolution, the
29 states named as having given their assent, including the
five which had changed their minds, were referred to as
"being three fourths and more of the several States of the
Union." 64
Inasmuch as Congress did not take this action until addi-
tional ratifications had been certified, it is plausible to infer
that a majority did not support the view of Sumner and
Bingham that the Amendment had become effective before
the further ratifications or attempted withdrawals were
made. The resolution adopted was not, however, incon-
sistent with their thesis. It also can be supported by John-
son's tentative opinion that a state's assent could be re-
voked at any time before ratification was complete. In the
absence of committee reports or recorded debate, it is im-
possible to find in this legislative history an endorsement of
either of the two theories advanced for declaring the
amendment adopted.
In any event, the inclusion in this list of Louisiana, North
Carolina and South Carolina is not decisive as to the effect
of a rejection by a legislature which is admittedly com-
petent to act on a constitutional amendment. At the time
they expressed their dissent, these states were treated by
Congress as being still in a state of rebellion; they were re-
quired to adopt new constitutions and to ratify the pending
amendment before they could obtain readmission to the
Union.65
That the resolution declaring the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment was not regarded as a determination of
the effect either of rejection or withdrawal was demonstrat-
ed by events attending the adoption of the Fifteenth
Amendment. Again, Ohio reversed itself, this time by ap-
63 Id. at 4296.
64 Id. at 4266. Emphasis supplied.
65 15 STAT. 2 (1867) ; 15 STAT. 73 (1868).
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proving the Amendment after first voting against it, 6 while
New York repudiated its earlier assent.67 In discussing
these developments on the floor of the Senate, Roscoe
Conkling of New York took the position that a ratification
was irrevocable but that a rejection had no legal effect
whatsoever." Davis of Kentucky argued that a vote by a
state legislature either to reject or to ratify was final and
conclusive. 9 Significantly, neither mentioned the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment or the resolution of Congress
declaring it to be in effect.
Not until two additional states had ratified, thus making
it unimportant whether New York and Ohio were counted,
did the Secretary of State proclaim the adoption of the
amendment. His proclamation listed these two states among
those which had ratified, but it also recited without com-
ment that the New York Legislature had passed resolu-
tions "claiming to withdraw" its ratification. Ohio's pre-
vious rejection was not mentioned.70 Prior to the issuance
of this proclamation, a resolution similar to that adopted
with reference to the Fourteenth Amendment had been in-
troduced in the Senate to confirm the Fifteenth, but it
never came to a vote.71 Without qualification, it named
New York and Ohio as having ratified the latter Amend-
ment.
The persistence of sharp disagreement as to the correct
interpretation of Article V is reflected in the unsuccessful
effort made at this time to pass a bill declaring that any
attempted revocation of a State's consent to an amendment
66 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 110 (1869) ; Id. at 918 (1870).
67 CONG. GwOBEa 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 377 (1870).
68 Id. at 1477.
69 Id. at 1479. Both Conkling and Davis argued from the premise that rati-
fication by a state legislature had the same effect as would ratification by a con-
vention in case that method were chosen by Congress. Both assumed that rati-
fication by a convention would be final. Davis made the further assumption that
rejection by a convention would exhaust the power of a state to act on an amend-
ment. Conkling did not meet this issue squarely.
70 CONG. GLoBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2290 (1870).
71 Id. at 1444, 2738, 3142.
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should be treated as null and void. The House approved
such a measure,7 2 which, however, died on the Senate Cal-
endar after being reported adversely by the Judiciary Com-
mittee.7" Earlier in the session the upper House had voted
to postpone indefinitely a joint resolution of similar tenor.74
Looking to the merits of the issue, there appears to be
nothing in the language or policy of Article V to preclude
ratification at any time, irrespective of prior disapproval.
The Constitution speaks only of ratification by the states;
there is no reason why an unfavorable vote by one legis-
lature should bar contrary action by its successors. The
teaching of Dillon v. Gloss that ratification should "reflect
the will of the people in all sections at relatively the same
period . . ." lends support to the view that later retraction
should also be taken into account. Likewise, if change of pub-
lic sentiment is relevant, the formal action of a state with-
drawing its prior consent is pertinent. What weight should
be given this relevant fact would, however, be for Congress
to determine.
A long-mooted question concerning the right of a state
to require that action on a proposed amendment be delayed
until a new legislature has been elected was answered in
Leser v. Garnett. 75 The fact that the Constitution of Ten-
nessee required such postponement was cited in support
of the argument that the purported ratification of the Nine-
teenth Amendment by the Legislature of that State was a
nullity. Instead, the Supreme Court held that this consti-
72 Id. at 5356.
73 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1381 (1871).
74 CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1869); Id. at 3971 (1870).
75 258 U. S. 130, 137, 42 S. Ct. 217, 66 L. Ed. 505 (1922). Massachusetts
passed a law in 1920 which declared it "to be the policy of the commonwealth that
the general court, when called upon to act upon a proposed amendment to the
federal constitution, should defer action until the opinion of the voters of the com-
monwealth has been taken . . ." It provided further that if an amendment is not
ratified by the session of the general court to which it is first submitted, it shall
be submitted to the people at the following state election. MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 53,
§ 18 (1946).
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tutional provision was of no effect, since the power to act
on a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is de-
rived from the latter document.
Procedure for Ratification
When a constitutional amendment is before a state
for consideration, who constitutes the "legislature" by
which its will is to be expressed, and what rules govern
the proceedings? It was decided in Hawke v. Smith "' that
the term "legislatures" as used in Article V still means, as
it did in 1789, "the representative bod[ies] which . . .
[make] the laws of the people." 71 It therefore does not in-
clude the electorate in states where the popular referendum
has become a part of the legislative process, and approval
by the people on a referendum vote cannot be made a
condition of ratification. Similarly, it has been established
by practice, with the -implied approval of the Supreme
Court, that legislative resolutions ratifying proposed amend-
ments to the Federal Constitution are not subject to guber-
natorial veto. In Leser v. Garnett, it appeared that the
Governor of Tennessee had not certified the ratification
of the Nineteenth Amendment to the Secretary of State.
The Supreme Court held, nevertheless, that the Amendment
had been validly ratified, saying "As the legislatures of
Tennessee and of West Virginia had power to adopt the
resolutions of ratification, official notice to the Secretary,
duly authenticated, that they had done so, was conclusive
upon him. .. 7.
76 253 U. S. 221, 40 S. Ct. 495, 64 L. Ed. 871 (1920).
77 Id., 253 U. S. at 227.
78 258 U. S. 130, 137, 42 S. Ct. 217, 66 L. Ed. 505 (1922). The effect of a
gubernatorial veto was called into question in connection with the adoption of the
Twelfth Amendment. The Governor of New Hampshire vetoed the resolution of
that State's Legislature to ratify the proposal. If effective, ratification by New
Hampshire would have brought the total of consenting states to the necessary three-
fourths. The amendment was not proclaimed, however, until another state had
ratified, and the proclamation did not include New Hampshire as one of the rati-
fying states. Myers, op. cit. supra note 46, at 34.
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The Constitution is silent concerning the procedures to
be followed by state legislatures in acting on proposed
constitutional amendments, and Congress has never under-
taken to supply the omission. In 1869, to be sure, joint
resolutions for this purpose were presented in both Houses
of Congress but did not pass in either.79 The resolution in-
troduced into the House of Representatives would have
required each branch of a state legislature to proceed to a
consideration of a pending amendment on the sixth day of
any regular or special session, and to continue to meet until
final action was taken on the amendment. A proposed
change was to be deemed ratified if it received the vote of
a majority of the members elected to each house. Whether
such a measure is within the power of Congress incident
to the submission of amendments is doubtful.
A still unsettled question which has arisen from time
to time is whether provisions of state constitutions defining
a quorum, prescribing the majority. necessary for the en-
actment of legislation, or regulating the conduct of legis-
lative business are applicable to ratification of amendments
to the Federal Constitution. In 1871, the Indiana Senate
voted to rescind that State's "pretended ratification" of
the Fifteenth Amendment, on the ground, among others,
that this action had been taken by less than a quorum of
each house of the state legislature as defined by the state
constitution.8" More recently, the purported ratification of
the Child Labor Amendment by at least two states was
clouded by uncertainty as to the effect of state consti-
tutional provisions governing the passage of a local law.
The Governor of Illinois certified to the Secretary of State
that this Amendment had been ratified by the Illinois
Legislature, although the resolution to that effect had been
79 CONG. GLoBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 75, 102, 334 (1869). The House resolu-
tion bore a strong resemblance to the act passed in 1866 (14 STAT. 243) requiring
state legislatures to meet at an appointed day and to proceed as therein directed to
elect a United States Senator.
80 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1250 (1871).
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adopted in the Senate by less than a majority of all mem-
bers elected thereto, as required for the enactment of legis-
lation.81 On the other hand, the ratification of this pro-
posal by Kansas was valid only if the provision of the
state constitution authorizing the Lieutenant Governor to
cast a deciding vote applied to the ratification of an amend-
ment."'
Since proposed amendments are submitted to the state
legislatures and not to the people it would seem, on prin-
ciple, that restrictions imposed by the people, in the state
constitution, on the adoption of legislation, should not be
binding with respect to the performance of this federal
function if the legislature chooses to adopt other rules. But
in the absence of special rules sanctioning a different pro-
cedure, by what authority can it be said that proceedings
which do not conform to the requirements for ordinary
legislation constitute the action of the state legislature with-
in the sense of Article V?
As long as the Supreme Court adhered to the position
taken in Leser v. Garnett that official notice to the Secre-
tary of State that a State had ratified an amendment "was
conclusive upon him, and, being certified to by his procla-
mation, is conclusive upon the courts," 83 questions as to the
regularity of state action were of little more than academic
interest. But in Coleman v. Miller and Chandler v. Wise 84
the Court, in effect, closed the door to judicial determina-
tion of these issues. In the former it held that the legal
consequences of a previous rejection of an amendment by a
state legislature, and of the lapse of time since the sub-
mission of the proposal, were political questions which
should be resolved by Congress rather than by the courts
Being equally divided on the point, it did not decide
81 JOURNAL OF 'THE ILLuois STATE SENATE, 58th General Assembly 1751 (1933).
82 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 446, 59 S. Ct. 972, 83 L. Ed. 1385 (1939).
83 Leser v. Garnett, 258 U. S. 130, 137, 42 S. Ct. 217, 66 L. Ed. 505 (1922).
84 307 U. S. 474, 59 S. Ct. 992, 83 L. Ed. 1407 (i939).
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whether the right of a Lieutenant Governor to cast a de-
ciding vote was a justiciable issue. Although this case left
open the possibility that some questions might still be
found to be justiciable at some stage, the opinion in Chand-
ler v. Wise indicates that even those questions might cease
to be cognizable by a court before it had an opportunity to
pass upon them. There citizens and taxpayers sued to
restrain the Governor of Kentucky from certifying an al-
legedly void resolution of the state legislature purporting to
ratify the Child Labor Amendment. Before being served
with summons in this suit, the Governor forwarded a cer-
tified copy of the resolution to the Secretary of State by
mail. The Supreme Court dismissed a writ of certiorari
on the ground that while the state court had jurisdiction
in limine, after the Governor had transmitted the notice of
ratification "there was no longer a controversy susceptible
of judicial determination." 85
In a concurring opinion in the Coleman case, four Jus-
tices expressed the view that the process of amendment "is
'political' in ,its entirety, from submission until an amend-
ment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not subject
to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point." 86
Even without this invitation, the uncertainty as to what, if
any, questions the courts would entertain in the future
would constitute a strong inducement to Congress to occupy
the whole field. And once it has done so, it is extremely
improbable that the Supreme Court would undertake to
eject it.
Nor is it likely that Congress would exhibit the same re-
luctance to examine the regularity of state action as has
the Court. Moreover, there appears to be no reason why
all decisions concerning the ratification of an amendment
could not be taken by a simple majority vote. Since such
votes would, on the surface at least, relate merely to ques-
85 Id., 307 U. S. at 478.
86 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 459, 59 S. Ct. 972, 83 L. Ed. 1385 (1939).
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tions of fact and of law raised by objections to the validity
of purported ratification, rather than to the wisdom of the
amendment, it would be straining a point to say that they
were governed 'by the phrase "whenever two thirds of both
houses shall deem necessary." No other provision of the
Constitution would require more than a simple majority in
this situation. The only legislative precedent is the resolu-
tion adopted in 1868 declaring the Fourteenth Amendment
to be a part of the Constitution. In the House of Repre-
sentatives, 127 members voted in the affirmative, 33 in the
negative, with 55 not voting." The yeas and nays were
not taken in the Senate. The Congressional Globe simply
recites: "The resolution was adopted." 8
IV.
Conclusion
No amendment to the Constitution has been adopted
since Coleman v. Miller was decided. Any estimate of its
practical results lies, therefore, entirely in the realm of
speculation. Where an amendment is sharply controversial,
there is a strong possibility that the issue will be fought out
all over again in the Halls of Congress after three-fourths
of the states have given their assent. To this extent the
process of changing the Constitution may become still more
difficult than it has been in the past. In view of the de-
cision in Dillon v. Gloss that an amendment takes effect on
the date of the final ratification required for its adoption,
rather than on the date when it is proclaimed, 9 there is a
further possibility of a period of serious confusion and un-
certainty while the validity of ratification is being deter-
mined.
87 CoNG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 4296 (1868).
88 Id. at 4266.
89 256 U. S. 368, 376, 41 S. Ct. 510, 65 L. Ed. 994 (1921).
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To leave the way open for Congress to bury a proposed
amendment even after three-fourths of the states have ap-
proved it seems to be consonant with the purpose of the
framers to permit changes in the fundamental law only
when there is a strong preponderance of contemporaneous
opinion in favor of it. If a majority of both Houses of
Congress felt compelled for any reason to declare that a
proposed amendment had not been duly ratified, that action
would raise grave doubts as to whether the amendment had
the requisite support in public opinion at that time. But
if the lawmakers are to exercise this function some way
must be found to minimize the confusion until the issue is
decided. The ruling that an amendment becomes effective
the moment the thirty-sixth state ratifies it should be re-
pudiated. And provision should be made for determining
when Congress has said its final word on the subject. Al-
though it has been suggested that in proclaiming an amend-
ment, the Secretary of State speaks with the authority of
Congress, no one can say whether such a proclamation
would preclude subsequent inquiry into the validity of rati-
fication, or if not, whether there is any time limit on the
power of Congress to reopen the matter. In 1930, eleven
years after the Eighteenth Amendment was ratified, Repre-
sentative La Guardia of New York offered a joint resolu-
tion to declare that amendment inoperative on the ground
that ratification of the original resolution was ineffective to
make the amendment a permanent part of the Constitu-
tion." But as this resolution was never acted upon the
question remains unanswered.
One method of handling the problem might be for Con-
gress to repeal the present statute authorizing the Secre-
tary of State to proclaim the adoption of an amendment im-
mediately upon receipt of official notice of the requisite
90 72 CoNG. REC. 1761 (1930). This resolution was referred to the Committee
on the judiciary and was never reported. For a statement of the author's reasoning,
see note 50 supra.
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ratifications. Instead, he might be directed to transmit such
evidence to Congress when three-fourths of the states have
purported to ratify. To avoid a stalemate, it might be de-
sirable to provide that unless Congress directs otherwise
with a designated period, the Secretary should issue, at the
end of such period, a proclamation, which should Jbe deem-
ed conclusive, declaring that the amendment had been
adopted. In any event, having been given virtually com-
plete responsibility in the premises, it is up to Congress to
provide some procedure for a prompt and definitive de-
cision as to the validitt of the ratification of any amend-
ments it proposes.
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